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The Solution to the Economic Loss
Doctrine Confusion:
The Disappointed Expectations Test
MacKenzie Mayes Walter
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION
Imagine driving down a curvy road when the brakes of your brand new
car suddenly fail. You try to pull your emergency brake to no avail, and as
you approach a sharp curve, you realize that your only option is to jump
out of the car. You swing open the driver's side door and leap out of the
moving vehicle with just enough time to look up and see your car fly over
an embankment and smash into a tree. You stand up, dust yourself off, and
can only think about suing the car manufacturer for this defective car that
almost killed you.
The good news is that you are still alive. The bad news is that because
you have no physical injuries or damage to property other than the car, you
have incurred nothing more than economic loss. As such, the economic loss
doctrine will bar recovery in tort for the loss of the value of your new car.
Traditionally, "[elconomic loss is the loss in a product's value which occurs
because the product 'is inferior in quality and does not work for the gen-
eral purposes for which it was manufactured and sold."'" In other words,
"economic loss is damage to a product itself or monetary loss caused by the
defective product, which does not cause personal injury or damage to other
property."3
Because the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery of purely eco-
nomic loss in tort law, a purchaser of a defective product cannot pursue a
cause of action in tort under negligence or strict liability theories for such
loss.4 Economic loss is categorized as either direct or indirect economic
loss. Direct economic losses include damage to the product itself result-
i J.D. 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S. with Highest Distinctions,
Journalism and Political Science, Indiana University, 2002. The author wishes to thank her
husband, Carl, for his unconditional love. The author would also like to thank Professor
Richard C. Ausness, Professor Mary J. Davis, and Dana R. Howard for their much appreciated
guidance and support. Finally, the author would like to thank Judge Jennifer B. Coffman for
her inspiration and encouragement.
2 Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445,451 (Wis. 1999) (quoting
Northridge Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis 2d 79, 925-26.(Wis. 1991)).
3 Id.
4 Id.
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ing in "loss of the value of the bargain" and repair or replacement costs.'
"Indirect economic losses include lost profits and loss of future business
opportunities.
' 6
Although this doctrine may appear absurd by positioning itself on a
tightrope between tort law and contract law,7 the application of and policies
supporting the economic loss doctrine are extremely valuable in American
jurisprudence. While damages such as personal injury or damage to other
property are actionable in tort or contract, in most jurisdictions, consumers
who suffer solely economic harm are limited to relying exclusively on con-
tract remedies.8 Such a line provides an appropriate division between two
distinct areas of law, prohibiting actions better suited for contract law from
entering into the world of tort.
Plaintiffs attempt to pursue tort claims for economic losses for a vari-
ety of reasons. Although purchasers may receive the broad protection of an
express or implied warranty, other Uniform Commercial Code 9 provisions
allow sellers to limit the scope of the warranty by notice requirements 10 or
privity requirements." Often, buyers are required to provide reasonable
notice when goods are defective, giving the seller an opportunity to inspect,
correct, and negotiate regarding the non-conforming goods." In addition,
horizontal 3 and vertical privity 14 requirements traditionally served as dif-
ficult hurdles for purchasers to recover in contract. However, the UCC is
now more liberal in allowing horizontal privity, providing states with three
alternatives. 5 Further, although most states do not require vertical privity
5 Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REv. 505, 511-12
(1994).
6 Id. at 512.
7 See RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF ToRTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (1998).
8 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 5 2.
9 Hereinafter "UCC."
10 U.C.C. § z-6o7(3)(a) (1998).
11 U.C.C.§ 2-318(i998).
12 SeeAusness, supra note 5, at 54 .
13 See id. at 515 ("Horizontal privity describes the relationship between the seller and
ultimate user. If strict horizontal privity is required, the seller is liable only to the buyer and
not to others who may use or consume the product."); see also Elizabeth A. Heiner, Note,
Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc.: What Recovery for Economic Loss-
Tort or Contract?, 199o Wis. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (990).
14 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 515 ("Vertical privity describes the relationship between
parties in the marketing chain. If vertical privity is required, only the immediate buyer can
recover against a seller for breach of warranty."); see also Edward H. Rabin & Jill Herman
Grossman, Defective Products or Realty Causing Economic Loss: Towarda Unified Theory of Recovery,
12 Sw. U. L. REv. 4, 15-16 (1981).
15
Alternative A extends a seller's warranty to "any natural person who is
in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home" if
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for breach of an express warranty,16 "it is less clear whether vertical privity
is required to sue for breach of an implied warranty."17 Because tort law
generally offers a "broader array" of damages than contract law, many prod-
uct liability plaintiffs prefer suing in tort."s
In addition, disclaimers 9 and exclusions of remedies 0 are challenges
for purchasers who pursue a cause of action in contract. Some sellers in-
corporate disclaimers in the contract, preventing a warranty from arising or
limiting its normal scope.' Although most courts hold that a seller cannot
disclaim an express warranty," sellers may disclaim an implied warranty of
merchantability or an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose if
certain criteria are met. 3 Also, limitations or exclusions serve to restrict the
remedies available. "[Ijmplied warranties may be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or performance, or trade usage." 4
Finally, the applicable statute of limitations for contract causes of action
can be a substantial barrier in products liability claims."z A cause of action
accrues in contract law when the contract breach occurs. Unfortunately for
consumers, courts consider the breach to occur at the time the seller ten-
ders the goods for delivery. Thus, in most states, a four-year statute of limi-
tations begins to run the day the purchaser receives the product. Therefore,
the victim suffered a personal injury and could reasonably be expected
to use, consume, or be affected by the goods. Alternative B extends a
seller's warranty not only to users or consumers, but also to any party
who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the goods. However,
both Alternative A and Alternative B are arguably limited to physical
injuries, and therefore may not cover purely economic harm. Alternative
C, on the other hand, does not limit warranty protection to natural per-
sons, nor does it include the "injured person" language. Presumably,
Alternative C would permit one who suffered foreseeable economic
harm to recover against the seller for breach of warranty even in the
absence of horizontal privity.
See Ausness, supra note 5, at 515.
16 See id. at 5 15-16; see also Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 Ead izo8,
1211 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying Ohio law); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 181
N.E.zd 399,403-04 (N.Y. 1962).
17 SeeAusness, supra note 5, at 516.
18 Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Wis. 2005).
19 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 516 ("A disclaimer is a clause in a contract that prevents a
warranty from arising or limits its normal scope.").
zo See id. at 517 ("In contrast [to a disclaimer], a limitation or exclusion does not prevent
a warranty from arising, but restricts the remedies available to the injured party if a breach
occurs.").
21 Seeid. at516.
22 Id.; see, e.g., N. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 412 (8th Cir.
1985).
23 See U.C.C. § z- 3 16(z) (1998); Ausness, supra note 5, at 516-17.
24 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 517.
25 See id. at 517-18.
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the purchaser "will have no cause of action if an injury occurs more than
four years after the date of delivery."' 6 In contrast, "[tiort law principles are
often more favorable to consumers than contract law." 7 There are no priv-
ity requirements in tort."8 Sellers cannot avoid liability by disclaiming or
limiting remedies.2 9 Statutes of limitations are also more favorable in tort
law.30 Although usually one to six years,3" the statute of limitations for tort
causes of action incorporates a "discovery rule," which tolls the running
of the statute until the victim discovers or should have discovered the in-
jury.3" Finally, punitive damages, which are precluded under contract law,
are available in tort.33 Therefore, in cases where tort law is the only avail-
able remedy, due to the challenging barriers in contract causes of action,
the applicability of the economic loss doctrine becomes a critical question.
The economic loss doctrine reaches into many areas of the law, including
products liability law.34 Where it reaches, it cuts deep, acting as a complete
bar to recovery.3"
This Note focuses on the application of the economic loss doctrine in
products liability cases. Part II of this Note will address the three main
approaches courts use to apply the economic loss doctrine-the Santor36
rule, the "type of consumer" rule, and the "physical injury" rule. Because
the "physical injury" rule best represents the historical policies support-
ing the fundamental distinction between contract law and tort law, Part III
concludes that this majority approach is superior. Part III will also examine
the nuances that courts use in applying this majority rule, concluding that
the "disappointed expectations" interpretation provides the most satisfac-
tory outcomes and should be incorporated into the "integrated systems"
26 See id. at 518. Furthermore, the statute of limitations in contract causes of action
"begins to run at the time of sale, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
product defect." Id. at 518;see also U.C.C. § 2-725(0) (1998) ("An action for breach of any con-
tract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.").
27 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 518.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1,
28 (2005) ("Every jurisdiction has a statute of limitations governing claims for personal injury
or tortiously caused harm, with time periods ranging from i year (in California, Kentucky,
Louisiana, and Tennessee) to 6 years (in Maine and North Dakota). The most common peri-
ods are 2 and 3 years.")
32 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 518.
33 John J. Laubmeier, Comment, Demystifying Wisconsin's Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005
Wis. L. REV. 225, 228.
34 Id. at 227.
35 Id.
36 See Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.zd 305 (N.J. 1965).
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approach when "'prevention of the subject risk was one of the contractual
expectations motivating the purchase of the defective product."'37
II. APPROACHES To AND POLICIES BEHIND THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
Although all American jurisdictions permit tort recovery for injured con-
sumers for personal injuries and damage to other property, many jurisdic-
tions differ with respect to whether recovery is available in tort for purely
economic loss.38 While "[a] few courts allow [tort] recovery in any situa-
tion,"39 some limit recovery in tort to ordinary consumers under the "type
of consumer" approach. 40 Most courts, however, apply a "physical injury"
approach, limiting recovery in tort to physical injury, 41 which includes per-
sonal injury and damage to one's property, as opposed to solely economic
harm.
4
A. The Santor Rule
In Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., the plaintiff sought recovery against
a manufacturer for defective carpeting. 43 Almost immediately after pur-
chase, the plaintiff noticed an unusual line in the carpet that continued to
worsen.' Of course, this defect did not cause any personal injuries or any
damage to the plaintiff's other property. Nonetheless, in addition to having
a warranty claim, the court permitted the plaintiff to sue for the economic
loss of the rug under the doctrine of strict liability in tort.45 The court noted
that "when the manufacturer presents his goods to the public for sale he
accompanies them with a representation that they are suitable and safe for
the intended use."'  In addition, the court continued,
37 Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.zd 167, 178 (Wis. 2005) (quoting Rich Prods.
Corp. v. Kemutech, Inc., 66 F Supp. zd 937, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1999)).
38 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 522.
39 See id.; see, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Lakeshore, Inc., 753 F.zd 85i, 855-56 (ioth Cir.
1985) (allowing recovery for economic loss when unreasonable risk of injury involved); Cova
v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 18z N.W.2d 8oo, 804 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (allowing recovery
in tort for economic loss resulting from defective golf carts); see also Lloyd F Smith Co. v.
Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. 491 N.W.zd 1i, 17 (Minn. 1992) (holding that tort remedies are available for
economic loss although the UCC provides the exclusive remedy in commercial transactions).
40 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 522; see also Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liabilily
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STANr. L. REV. 974, 989 (1966) (recognizing
the concern of judges for the interests of ordinary consumers).
41 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 522.
42 Id. at 523.
43 Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 307 (N.J. 1965).
44Id.
45 Id. at 311.
46 Id.
2oo6-2oo7]
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The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage,
either to the goods sold or to other property, resulting from defective prod-
ucts, is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels
of trade, rather than by the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are
powerless to protect themselves.
47
Thus, the "restrictive notions of privity of contract.., must be put aside
and the realistic view of strict tort liability [be] adopted"48 for economic loss
resulting from the defective products sold, personal injury, or damage to
the consumer's other property.
Since Santor, the New Jersey Supreme Court has shifted away from
permitting recovery in tort for purely economic loss.49 In fact, only a hand-
ful of jurisdictions have followed the Santor rule. 0
B. The "Type of Consumer" Rule
The second approach that courts use to determine whether purely eco-
nomic loss is recoverable in tort law is the "type of consumer" rule."' This
rule focuses on the sophistication of the consumer involved in the dispute.5"
Under this theory, ordinary consumers may recover for economic harm in
tort and contract because they "do not have the expertise to accurately as-
sess economic risks, and ... they do not have sufficient economic strength
to protect themselves against economic loss through the bargaining pro-
cess."5' 3 However, commercial purchasers are limited solely to recovery in
contract law because they have relatively equal bargaining power and are
more equipped to contractually bargain.-4 These policy considerations con-
vinced the Supreme Court of New Jersey to apply the "type of consumer"
approach in Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.5" In this case,
because the purchaser of the Ford truck was a commercial buyer, recovery
for economic loss was restricted solely to contract law.56 Unfortunately, the
four-year statute of limitations for contract claims had already expired, pre-
cluding any recovery for the commercial buyer.5 7
47 Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
48 Id.
49 SeeAlloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264, 275 (N.J. 1997).
50 Id. at 271.
51 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 522.
52 Id. at 522-23.
53 Id. at 523.
54 Id.
55 See Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 66o, 663 (N.J. 1985).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 674.
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Justice Peters's dissenting opinion in Seely v. White Motor Co. also en-
dorsed the "type of consumer" principles and identified the policies be-
hind this approach. 8 In determining whether to provide recovery in tort,
the Seely majority drew a line based on the type of damage involved, plac-
ing damage resulting from economic harm as actionable only in contract
and placing economic damage resulting from physical harm to self or other
property on the other side of the line, providing a claim in tort or contract.5 9
In his dissent, Justice Peters called this distinction "arbitrary."'  Instead,
he argued, "What is important is not the nature of the damage but the rela-
tive roles played by the parties to the purchase contract and the nature of
their transaction. '61 Recognizing that it is "well established that [recov-
ery for personal injury damages] may include compensation for [economic
losses such as] past loss of time and earnings due to the injury,"6 Justice
Peters noted:
There is no logical distinction between these losses and the losses suffered
by the plaintiff here. All involve economic loss, and all proximately arise
out of the purchase of a defective product. I find it hard to understand how
one might, for example, award a traveling salesman lost earnings if a defect
in his car causes his leg to break in an accident but deny that salesman his
lost earnings if the defect instead disables only his car before any accident
occurs. The losses are exactly the same .... Yet the majority would allow
recovery under strict liability in the first situation but not in the second. 
63
Justice Peters continued his "type of consumer" argument, stating that
because the majority acknowledges that "the rules governing warranties
were developed to meet the needs of'commercial transactions,"'" the ma-
jority should have determined whether the ultimate purchaser was an or-
dinary consumer or a commercial purchaser. He argued that the majority's
focus on the nature of the damages resulting from the defect (i.e., personal
injury or mere destruction of the product) at a time "long after the transac-
tion had been completed" was inappropriate.
65
Justice Peters's separate opinion also contrasted a society in which ev-
eryone has equal bargaining power to our modern-day commercial real-
ity in which "'standardized mass contract has appeared."'" Justice Peters
58 Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 157 (Cal. 1965) (Peters, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
59 Id. at 151-52 (majority opinion).
60 Id. at 154 (Peters, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61 Id. at 153.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 153-54.
64 Id. at 156.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 156-57 (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.zd 69, 86 (N.J.
2oo6-2oo7]
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feared the lack of bargaining power of the ordinary consumer in the mod-
ern era, where such consumers are "frequently not in a position to shop
around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract
has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors have the
same clauses. '67 In such situations, Justice Peters noted that the ordinary
consumer's contractual intention merely becomes "a subjection ... to terms
dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often under-
stood in a vague way, if at all."'
Therefore, the "type of consumer" rule focuses on the principle ad-
opted in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, which states that strict prod-
uct liability should protect "injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves."'69 By permitting economic loss recovery in tort for less sophis-
ticated, ordinary consumers, this goal is arguably accomplished.
C. The "Physical Injury" Rule
Rather than concentrating on the type of consumer involved in the dispute,
the "physical injury" interpretation of the economic loss doctrine focuses on
the type of injury claimed. "The economic loss doctrine has been traced to
a landmark decision by the California Supreme Court, Seely v. White Motor
Co.," 70 in which Justice Traynor carefully explored the boundary between
tort and contract in products liability litigation. In Seely, the plaintiff had
purchased a heavy-duty truck with an express warranty by the manufactur-
er, guaranteeing the vehicle to be free from defects in material and work-
manship and limiting its obligation under the warranty for replacement
of parts.' The truck had serious problems, and for eleven months, with
guidance from the manufacturer, the dealer unsuccessfully attempted to
fix the vehicle.7" Ultimately, the plaintiff was driving the vehicle around a
curve when the brakes failed, and the truck overturned.73 The plaintiff suf-
fered no physical injuries but subsequently sought recovery for repairs to
the truck, for the amount paid on the price of the truck, and for the profits
his business lost as a result of his inability make normal use of the truck. 4
Relying on an express warranty theory, the trial judge ruled for the plaintiff
on the counts of lost profits and the amount paid on the purchase price.7
1 96o)).
67 Id. at 157 (quoting Henningsen, 16I A.2d at 86).
68 Id. (quoting Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 86).
69 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897,901 (Cal. 1963).
70 Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Wis. 2005).
71 Seely, 403 P.zd at 147-48.
72 Id. at 147.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 147-48.
75 Id. at 148.
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Although the contention had been made that statutory recovery under
breach of warranty had been "superseded by the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity in tort set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc." the Seely court
disagreed. 6 Justice Traynor held, "[tihe history of the doctrine of strict li-
ability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the war-
ranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but,
rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries."'7 Thus, the
court recognized that contract law and strict liability in tort may coexist,
leaving contract law as the best suited to deal with economic losses. There-
fore, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in contract law for his commercial
losses, loss of profits, and refund of money he paid on the truck because the
manufacturer warranted the truck to be free from defects.8 In other words,
"[h]ad defendant not warranted the truck, but sold it 'as is,' it should not be
liable for the failure of the truck to serve plaintiff's business needs."' 9
Further, Justice Traynor recognized that if the court allowed the plain-
tiff to get this economic loss recovery under strict liability rather than con-
tract, "[t]he manufacturer would be liable for damages of unknown and
unlimited scope."8 Instead, the court said, "Application of the rules of war-
ranty prevents this result."'" Without an agreement which represents the
quality of the product, such as a warranty, the defendant should not be
liable for commercial losses.8" Therefore, the court adopted the so-called
economic loss doctrine, recognizing that although negligence and strict li-
ability actions allow recovery for physical injury to a plaintiff's property and
for personal injury, a plaintiff may not recover for purely economic loss in
tort.
3
In 1986, the economic loss doctrine gained widespread acceptance af-
ter the U.S. Supreme Court adopted this "physical injury" approach to the
doctrine in the seminal case of East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
76 Id. at 149.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 15o; see also Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.zd 167, 173 (Wis. 2005) (quot-
ing William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing CommercialLoss: The Ascendancy of Contract over
Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 731, 747-48 (199o) (summarizing the law following Seely: "If a prod-
uct fails to function properly, the buyer usually incurs expenses in repairing or replacing the
product. In addition, the buyer's business may be disrupted, resulting in lost profits. Such
"economic losses" generally cannot be recovered in tort actions alleging negligence or strict
product liability. If however, the defect in the product causes physical injury to property, tort
remedies are available. The distinction is easy to apply in some cases, but it poses severe dif-
ficulties in others." (emphasis in Grams))).
79 Seely, 403 P.zd at 15o.
80 Id. at 150-5 i.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 152.
2oo6-2oo7]
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Delava/Inc.Y In this case, defective turbines, each costing $1.4 million and
powering four supertankers, destroyed themselves. 8  Applying admiralty
law, the Court held that the economic loss doctrine barred tort recovery in
negligence or strict liability. 6 Because the defective product caused dam-
age only to itself, the plaintiff could not recover. In other words, a plaintiff
may not recover in tort for physical damage the defective product causes
to the "product itself," but may recover for physical damage the product
causes to "other property." Thus, in East River, the Supreme Court not
only "embraced the economic loss doctrine but expanded it, indicating
that physical damage to the product itself was covered by the doctrine.
87
Evidently, the Court was very concerned about preserving the distinction
between contract and tort, warning that if product liability were expanded
too far, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort."8 8
The Restatement (Third) of Torts section 21 restated the East River major-
ity view in 1998:
For purposes of this Restatement, harm to persons or property includes eco-
nomic loss if caused by harm to: (a) the plaintiff's person; or (b) the person
of another when harm to the other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff
protected by tort law; or (c) the plaintiff's property other than the defective
product itself.' 9
Basically, the Restatement recognizes, and the comments confirm, that
economic loss resulting from harm to the plaintiff's person, including loss
of earnings and reductions in earning capacity, would be permissible under
tort law.' In addition, "[wihen tort law recognizes the right of a plaintiff to
recover for economic loss arising from harm to another's person, that right
84 E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
85 Id. at 859-6o.
86 Id. at 871.
87 Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.zd 167, 173 (Wis. 2005); see also E. River, 476 U.S.
at 870.
We realize that the damage [to the defective product] may be quali-
tative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or
it may be calamitous. But either way, since by definition no person or
otherproperty is damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even
when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-
like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and
lost profits is essentially a failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit
of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract law.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
88 E. River, 476 U.S. at 866.
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 1(1998).
9o Id; see also id. cmt. b.
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is included within the rules of this Restatement.. . ."' In such cases, this
would allow recovery for loss of consortium or wrongful death.9" Next, the
Restatement acknowledges that "[a] defective product that causes harm
to property other than the defective product itself" is actionable in tort.93
Finally, the comments to section 21 clarify that when the harm is to the
defective product itself, losses flowing therefrom are not recoverable in
91 Id. cmt. c.
92
Thus, for example, actions under local common law and statutes for
loss of consortium or wrongful death on behalf of next of kin, although
not direct harms to the plaintiff's person, are included in Subsection (b).
Other examples of such rights may be recognized under local law, but
the categories included in Subsection (b) have traditionally been limited
in number.
Id.
93
A defective product that causes harm to property other than the
defective product itself is governed by the rules of this Restatement.
What constitutes harm to other property rather than harm to the product
itself may be difficult to determine. A product that nondangerously fails
to function due to a product defect has clearly caused harm only to itself.
A product that fails to function and causes harm to surrounding property
has clearly caused harm to other property. However, when a component
part of a machine or a system destroys the rest of the machine or system,
the characterization process becomes more difficult. When the product
or system is deemed to be an integrated whole, courts treat such damage
as harm to the product itself. When so characterized, the damage is
excluded from the coverage of this Restatement. A contrary holding
would require a finding of property damage in virtually every case in
which a product harms itself and would prevent contractual rules from
serving their legitimate function in governing commercial transactions.
The characterization of a claim as harm to other property may
trigger liability not only for the harm to physical property but also for
incidental economic loss. The extent to which incidental economic loss
is recoverable in tort is governed by general principles of legal cause.
See Restatement, Second, Torts §§ 43o-461.
One category of claims stands apart. In the case of asbestos
contamination in buildings, most courts have taken the position that
the contamination constitutes harm to the building as other property.
The serious health threat caused by asbestos contamination has led the
courts to this conclusion. Thus, actions seeking recovery for the costs of
asbestos removal have been held to be within the purview of products
liability law rather than commercial law.
Id. cmt. e.
2oo6-2oo71
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tort under the rules of the Restatement.'
In AJ. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,9" Maryland's high court ad-
opted the "physical injury" test and developed an analytical framework to
distinguish between the defective product itself and harm to other proper-
ty. This case involved the death of 140,000 chickens that suffocated when
a power failure eliminated ventilation in Decoster's chicken houses. 96 The
plaintiff sued Westinghouse, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective
switch that prevented the backup power system from engaging, alleging
counts of negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied war-
ranties for the loss of the chickens.97 Because the statute of limitations for
the warranty claims had expired, the trial court granted summary judgment
94
When a product defect results in harm to the product itself, the law
governing commercial transactions sets forth a comprehensive scheme
governing the rights of the buyer and seller. Harm to the product itself
takes two forms. A product defect may render the product ineffective so
that repair or replacement is necessary. Such a defect may also result in
consequential loss to the buyer. For example, a machine that becomes
inoperative may cause the assembly line in which it is being used to
break down and may lead to a wide range of consequential economic
losses to the business that owns the machine. These losses are not re-
coverable in tort under the rules of this Restatement. A somewhat more
difficult question is presented when the defect in the product renders it
unreasonably dangerous, but the product does not cause harm to persons
or property. In these situations the danger either (i) never eventuates in
harm because the product defect is discovered before it causes harm, or
(2) eventuates in harm to the product itself but not in harm to persons or
other property. A plausible argument can be made that products that are
dangerous, rather than merely ineffectual, should be governed by the
rules governing products liability law. However, a majority of courts have
concluded that the remedies provided under the Uniform Commercial
Code-repair and replacement costs and, in appropriate circumstances,
consequential economic loss-are sufficient. Thus, the rules of this
Restatement do not apply in such situations.
A second category of economic loss excluded from the coverage of
this Restatement includes losses suffered by a plaintiff but not as a di-
rect result of harm to the plaintiff's person or property. For example,
a defective product may destroy a commercial business establishment,
whose employees patronize a particular restaurant, resulting in econom-
ic loss to the restaurant. The loss suffered by the restaurant generally is
not recoverable in tort and in any event is not cognizable under products
liability law.
Id. cmt. d.
95 A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330 (Md. 1994).
96 Id. at 1331.
97 Id.
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for Westinghouse on those warranty claims.9" In addition, the trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's tort allegations, asserting the economic loss doc-
trine. 99
On appeal, Maryland's high court disagreed, holding that the plaintiff
adequately stated a cause of action in tort because the death of the chick-
ens was "a loss of physical property, rather than an economic loss."' The
court said, "[a] manufacturer may be held liable for physical injuries, in-
cluding harm to property, caused by defects in its products because it is
charged with the responsibility to ensure that its products meet a standard
of safety creating no unreasonable risk of harm.""'1 Here, the entirety of the
plaintiff's claim was the loss of 140,000 chickens and was thus solely a claim
for loss of property. The court distinguished this scenario from a situation
where the loss is purely economic, such as seeking recovery for the loss of
value of the switch, its replacement, repair costs, or lost profits.
1 02
By drawing the line and permitting recovery in tort for physical harm
to a consumer or his or her property, the court prevented the manufacturer
from escaping liability "simply because the dangerous nature of the [defec-
tive] product was undiscovered until after the warranties had expired."
' 10 3
In other words, in situations like this, "[tihe purchaser is not simply los-
ing the benefit of his bargain" by purchasing a defective product." This
would be best addressed by contract law. Rather, "the purchaser . . . is
sustaining damage to other property because that defect is so dangerous in
nature."105 The Maryland Supreme Court declared it "profoundly unfair"
to force the purchaser to bear the burden for the destruction of his chick-
ens.106 Instead, the court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the
plaintiff's negligence and strict liability claims." 7 As such, the loss of the
chickens was recoverable in tort.
The "physical injury" test has continued to gain ground and is now
considered the majority approach. In 2005, Isla Nena Air Services, Inc. v.
Cessna Aircraft Co.10 8 applied the "physical injury" rule, "limiting tort recov-
ery to damage to the plaintiff's property other than the defective product
98 Id.
99 Id.
Ioo Id. at 1333.
io Id. at 1332.
102 Id. at 1333.
103 Id. at 1337.
1o4 Id.
105 Id.
1o6 Id.
107 Id. at 1334, 1337 (stating that the loss of the chickens was a property loss, rather than
a purely economic loss, and that plaintiff's complaint contained allegations that supported a
claim of strict liability).
io8 Isla Nena Air Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 380 E Supp. 2d 74 (D.P.R. 2005).
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itself."'09 The court indicated that only four states have declined to follow
this approach, namely Oregon, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Washington,
whereas an "overwhelming majority of forty-six states have adopted it."10
Although the "physical injury" test has prevailed over both the Santor ap-
proach"' and "type of consumer" approach,"' courts continue to disagree
over the proper real-world application of what constitutes harm to "other
property" versus harm to the product itself. Therefore, several significant
interpretations of "other property" have evolved." 3
1. "Integrated Systems" Test.-East River" 4 and the Restatement (Third) of
Torts section 21"1i endorse the so-called "integrated systems" approach for
determining what distinguishes harm to "other property" from harm to the
product itself. According to section 21 comment e, "[a] product that non-
dangerously fails to function due to a product defect has clearly caused
harm only to itself," 116 precluding recovery in tort. On the other hand,
"[a] product that fails to function and causes harm to surrounding property
has clearly caused harm to other property," ' 7 permitting recovery in tort.
Unfortunately, this distinction becomes more difficult when dealing with a
defective component part that destroys the rest of the machine or system.
Section 21 comment e states, "When the product or system is deemed to
be an integrated whole, courts treat such damage as harm to the product
itself," and as such, the damage is precluded from recovery in tort, leaving
available solely contract remedies."" In other words, '[tihe integrated sys-
tems test looks at the system of which the defective product is a part, and
bars recovery if the plaintiff is alleging damage to any part of the system
under an other property theory."" 9
io9 Id. at 83.
i1D Id.
iiI See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
I 13 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998) (utilizing the
"integrated systems" approach); Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875,878
(1997) (applying "stream of commerce" approach modifying the "integrated systems" test);
Theuerkauf v. United Vaccines Div. of Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc., 821 E Supp. 1238, 1242
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (recognizing the "foreseeability" approach); Trans States Airlines v. Pratt &
Whitney Canada, Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45, 58 (II1. 1997) (discussing the "bargained-for" approach);
Gunkel v. Renovations, 822 N.E.2d 150, 155 (Ind. 2005) (discussing the "bargained-for" ap-
proach); Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.zd 167, 169 (Wis. 20o5) (applying the "disap-
pointed expectations" approach).
114 E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986).
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998).
1i6 Id.
117 Id.
I18 Id.
i9 See Laubmeier, supra note 33, at 234 (emphasis added).
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Although the purchaser in East River argued that the defective tur-
bines damaged "other property," (i.e., the supertankers powered by the
turbines)2 0 the Court chose the "integrated systems" approach. The Court
stated that no "'other' property" was damaged by the malfunctioning tur-
bines."' The Court reasoned that because the manufacturer supplied "each
turbine.. . as an integrated package.... each is properly regarded as a single
unit. 'Since all but the very simplest of machines have component parts,
[a contrary] holding would require a finding of [other] 'property damage'
in virtually every case where the product damages itself."" 2 Such a result
"would prevent contractual rules from serving their legitimate function in
governing commercial transactions."' 3 Further, East River concluded that
"a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either neg-
ligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring
itself." "24
In 2003, a federal district court applied the "integrated systems" ap-
proach in Isla Nena Air Services, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 23 in which a sin-
gle-engine plane had to make an emergency landing after suffering engine
failure.2 6 Isla Nena alleged the engine failure resulted from Cessna's in-
stillation of defective rivets in the air intake or from other defects in the
aircraft or its components for which Cessna was liable. 7 Although none of
the nine passengers were injured, the aircraft suffered "major damage to
all of its components and the engine was destroyed."' 1 8 Because the com-
plaint "allege[d] that damage to the product (the aircraft) was caused by a
defect in the product itself or in a component of the product (one or more
allegedly defective rivets)"'2 9 and failed to seek recovery for personal inju-
ries or damage to other property, the court held that the plaintiff's claims
were the subject of warranty and dismissed all claims. 3 °
This approach has received criticism because over time, "the param-
eters of this 'other property' exception have proved elusive."'' According
to Grams, the well-established "integrated systems" test for distinguishing
between damage to the product itself and damage to other property "does
1zo E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986).
121 Id.
122 Id. (quoting N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 330
(Alaska 1981)) (first alteration in original).
123 RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. Li.A. § 21 cmt. e (1998).
124 E. River, 476 U.S. at 871.
125 Isla Nena Air Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 380 E Supp. 2d 74 (D.P.R. 2005)
126 Id. at 75-76.
127 Id. at 76.
128 Id. at 76.
129 Id. at 82.
130 Id. at 81-82.
131 Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Wis. 2005).
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not translate well to all situations involving property damage to which the
economic loss doctrine logically applies."'32 Thus, application of such an
approach creates uncertainty in the court systems. For example, the "in-
tegrated systems" approach to the economic loss doctrine was at issue in
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court a total
of forty-seven times from 2000 to 2004.133 "The frequency of the economic
loss doctrine's appearance in the courts of Wisconsin reveals that the appli-
cation of the doctrine is a constantly developing area of law, which may not
be fully understood by judges, lawyers, or the public at large."'
34
2. Recent Trends That Reshape or Replace the "Integrated Systems" Test.-Al-
though the U.S. Supreme Court has not overturned the "integrated sys-
tems" approach set out in East River, the Court and several state courts
have recognized imperfections in this approach. For example, in Saratoga
Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 3 s the U.S. Supreme Court, applying ad-
miralty law, carved out a situation in which the "integrated systems" ap-
proach does not apply. The Court held that equipment and parts added
to the original product after the product enters the stream of commerce is
"other property" and is thus excluded from the economic loss doctrine.'36
In this case, the manufacturer sold a fishing vessel to an initial purchaser
who later added extra equipment including a skiff, a fishing net, and spare
parts. 37 The initial purchaser resold the fishing vessel, leaving the added
equipment on the ship. 3 8 When the allegedly defective hydraulic system,
which had been installed by the manufacturer, caused the ship to catch fire
and sink, the second purchaser sued in tort to recoup its loss, including the
loss of the equipment that the first purchaser had added. 39
Although the district court awarded damages to the owner for the loss of
this additional equipment,' 40 the Ninth Circuit reversed.' 4' Applying East
River's distinction between a product that itself causes the harm and "oth-
er property," the Ninth Circuit held that the economic loss doctrine also
barred recovery for the added equipment because pursuant to East River, it
was an integrated part of the ship when the initial purchaser sold it to the
second purchaser. 4 However, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, noting,
132 Id. at 175.
133 See Laubmeier, supra note 33, at 225.
134 Id. at 225-26
135 Saratoga Fishing Co.v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (i997).
136 Id. at 877.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 877-78.
140 Id.
141 See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle, Inc., 69 E3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. I995).
142 Id. at 1444-45.
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When a Manufacturer places an item in the stream of commerce by selling
it to an Initial User, that item is the "product itself" under East River. Items
added to the product by the Initial User are therefore "other property," and
the Initial User's sale of the product to a Subsequent User does not change
these characterizations. 3
Thus, the Court stated that "the case law does suggest a distinction
between the components added to a product by a manufacturer before the
product's sale to a user ... and those items added by a user to the manufac-
tured product ... , and we would maintain that distinction."
'144
In addition to clarifications by the U.S. Supreme Court, many jurisdic-
tions have attempted to perfect the real-world application of the economic
loss doctrine by modifying the analysis. In Theuerkauf v. United Vaccines
Div. of Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc.,' 45 the plaintiff sought recovery in tort
for the loss of 1,970 breed stock mink after the mink were injected with
an allegedly defective vaccine."4 Although the mink were clearly "other
property" compared to the vaccine, the court's analysis went further. Be-
cause there are many instances in which the damage to "other property" is
actually within the contemplation of the parties, the court concluded that
"[diamage to property, where it is the result of a commercial transaction
otherwise within the ambit of the UCC, should not preclude application of
the economic loss doctrine where such property damage necessarily results
from the delivery of a product of poor quality."
147
Therefore, an action must arise independently of the contract to main-
tain a tort claim, requiring the defendant to owe a duty to the plaintiff
"separate and distinct" from the duty under the contract.' A contrary
approach "would swallow the Economic Loss Doctrine because these torts
could be claimed anytime that a product did not work as it was supposed
to work." ' 49 In addition, the Theuerkauf court held that "the only remedy for
claims relating to the performance of the product, such as a claim that the
product did not work as it was supposed to work, may be brought under
contract law." 50 Thus, Theuerkauf applied the economic loss doctrine "even
though the damage claimed by the plaintiff occurred to property other than
143 Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 879.
144 Id. at 884.
145 Theuerkauf v. United Vaccines Div. of Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc., 821 F Supp.
1238 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
146 Id. at 1239.
147 Id. at 1241 (quoting Niebarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Mich.
1992)).
148 Id. (quoting Merchants Publ'g Co. v. Maruka Mach. Corp., 8oo E Supp. 1490, 1493
(W.D. Mich. 1992)).
149 Id.
15o Id. at 1241-42.
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the product itself." '' The "link between the [defective] product and the
harm caused [to the mink] does not require one to stretch one's imagina-
tion to reach some tangential nexus-it is the exact damage one would
expect from a defective vaccine."'s Because "the death of the mink was a
'natural, foreseeable result of the product's defect,"' the parties could have
negotiated allocation of this damage.s
3
The Supreme Court of Illinois took a different approach in Trans State
Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., concluding that a product and one
of its component parts may constitute two separate products if the parties
bargained separately for the individual components,' and thus the pur-
chaser could recover in tort for damage to the product caused by a defective
component. However, in Trans State Airlines, the court concluded that the
plaintiff bargained for and received a fully integrated aircraft and had thus
lost no more than that for which it had bargained.'s6 In 2005, the Indiana
Supreme Court applied a similar approach in Gunkelv. Renovations,57 hold-
ing that whether the damaged property qualifies as "other property" "turns
on whether it was acquired by the plaintiff as a component of the defective
product or was acquired separately".5 8
In Grams v. Milk Products, Inc., the Wisconsin Supreme Court incorpo-
rated a "disappointed expectations" analysis into the "integrated systems"
approach.s 9 Recognizing that "the 'integrated systems"' concept does not
translate well to all situations involving property damage to which the eco-
nomic loss doctrine logically applies[,]" the court shifted its analysis.160 In
cases where a defective product causes property damage but such damage
is within the scope of the bargaining, the economic loss doctrine will bar re-
covery in tort.' 6' In Grams, farmers who fed calves a non-medicated version
of milk substitute sued the manufacturer and distributor in contract and
tort, alleging that the poor nutritional content in the non-medicated replac-
er had not damaged the calves' immune systems, resulting in poor growth
151 Id. at 1242.
152 Id.
153 Id. (quoting Citizens Ins. Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, 802 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Mich.
1992)).
154 Trans State Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45 (111 997).
155 Id. at 57.
156 Id.
157 Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 15o (Ind. 2005).
158 Id. at 151.
159 Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 178 (Wis. 2005); see also id. at 175 n.8
("Contrary to the dissent's assertion that we 'fabricate' the disappointed expectations concept,
the concept has existed for more than twenty years, and has been adopted by numerous other
courts." (citation omitted)).
16o Id. at 175.
161 Id.
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and a tripled mortality rate. 161 Plaintiffs "urge[d the] court to resolve the
'other property' conundrum by adopting a 'new bright line rule,' that physi-
cal damage to anything other than the product itself would be considered
damage to 'other property' and therefore subject to suit in tort."'163 Under
such a theory, suits in tort would be permitted for damage to anything "be-
yond the physical dimensions of the purchased product,"'" 6 and in Grams,
the calves were clearly physically different from the milk replacer.
165
The Grams court declined to adopt the proposed bright-line rule, recog-
nizing that such a rule would prevent the important inquiry into the scope
of the bargain and instead would focus on "an overly formalistic distinction
based on the kind of property harmed."" 6 The court also believed that
such a bright-line test "would inevitably cause the erosion of the UCC,"
destroying the "fundamental distinction between contract and tort." 167 Ul-
timately, the Grams court incorporated a "disappointed expectations" anal-
ysis into the "integrated systems" approach in situations where "'preven-
tion of the subject risk was one of the contractual expectations motivating
the purchase of the defective product."" 68 In other words, the threshold
inquiry for this test is whether, at bottom, the claim involves disappoint-
ed performance expectations and whether the product failed to fulfill the
purchaser's contractual expectations. 169 The court carefully warned, "This
does not mean that contract principles will envelop all damages foresee-
able 'in a remote or general sense."' 70
In applying this test to the facts, the Grams court first determined the
contractual expectations motivating the purchase by considering the sub-
stance and purpose of the transaction. The court concluded that the milk
replacer was purchased to nourish the calves so that they would grow. 7'
Second, the court inquired whether the plaintiffs' claim involved disap-
pointment with those expectations.' The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs bought the milk replacer to nourish the calves but that the product left
them malnourished, which was just the opposite of what the purchasers
162 Id. at 170.
163 Id. at 178.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. (quoting Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 E Supp. 2d 937, 975 (E.D. Wis.
1999)).
169 Id. at 179.
170 Id. at 178 (quoting Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutech, Inc., 66 E Supp. 2d 937,975 (E.D.
Wis. 1999))
171 Id. at 179.
172 Id.
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expected.'73 In other words, the plaintiffs had disappointed expectations.
Although most facts would not be as straightforward as those in Grams, the
Grams court warned that "courts undertaking this inquiry should [not only]
be mindful to prevent 'contract from drowning in a sea of tort,' [but] they
should also prevent tort from drowning in a sea of contract." 17 4 In striking
this balance, the Grams court "believe[d] the disappointed expectations
concept will prove useful."'
Recently, in Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc.,17 6 the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals fleshed out the "disappointed expectations"
notion adopted in Grams. In Foremost Farms a dairy producer purchased a
defective drum of defoamer, which was used to reduce foaming during the
production of recon, a product utilized in making dairy products.' After
two years of successful use of defoamer, the plaintiff discovered that some
of its end dairy products were defective. 7 In fact, the end products were
unfit for human consumption, resulting in the consequential damages of
$587,118.30.179 Plaintiff determined that the defective defoamer which
ultimately yielded the unfit dairy products had originated in a particular
fifty-five gallon drum.8 0 Testing of this drum's defoamer revealed that it
contained a contaminant, phenol.'' The plaintiff sought recovery in tort
for distributing a defective product.8" However, the trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the economic
loss doctrine barred recovery in tort. 83 More specifically, the trial court held
that the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine did not
apply because "the allegedly defective defoamer became part of an 'inte-
grated system."""
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, reiterating the importance
of the two-step Grams analysis for the "other property" exception. 8 The
court began this analysis by stating, "Regardless whether property is other
property in a literal sense, it may be 'other property' in a legal sense for
173 Id.
174 Id. at i8o.
175 Id.
176 Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc., 726 N.W.2d 289 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2oo6).
177 Id. at 291-92.
178 Id. at 292.
179 Id. at 293 n.3.
18o Id. at 292.
181 Id. at 292 & n.2.
182 Id. at 292-93.
183 Id. at 293.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 298.
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purposes of the economic loss doctrine."1 16 The court recognized that in
determining if the damaged property is "other property" in a legal sense,
the two appropriate steps are the "integrated systems" test followed by the
"disappointed expectations" test.18 Under the "integrated systems" test,
the inquiry is "whether the allegedly defective product is a component in
a larger system."I' s The court added, "once a part becomes integrated into
a completed product or system, the entire product or system ceases to be
'other property' for purposes of the economic loss doctrine." 189 Upon the
conclusion of the "integrated systems" analysis, if the damaged property
is not "other property," the inquiry is over and the economic loss doctrine
bars recovery in tort.' 90 However, according to the court, if the damaged
property "appears" to be "other property" under the "integrated systems"
test, the court will then apply the "disappointed expectations" test. 91 In
Foremost Farms, the court concluded that a factual dispute remained as to
whether the defoamer or the phenol were components of the recon or end
dairy products under the "integrated systems" test' 9 and thus continued
its inquiry to step two.
The Foremost Farms court then explained the application of the "disap-
pointed expectations" test:
The test focuses on the expected function of the product and whether, from
the purchaser's perspective, it was reasonably foreseeable that the product
could cause the damage at issue. The test asks whether a reasonable pur-
chaser in the plaintiff's position should have foreseen the risk. Foreseeable
interaction between damaged property and the damage-causing product is
insufficient, by itself, to meet the "disappointed expectations" test.'93
186 Id. at 294;see Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.zd 167, 174 (Wis. 2005).
187 Foremost Farms, 726 N.W.zd at 294.
188 Id.
189 Id. (quoting Seizer v. Brunsell Bros., 65z N.W.2d 806, 834 (Wis. 2002)) (alteration in
original).
i9o Id. at 295.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 298-99.
193 Id. at 300.
We note that "reasonable foreseeability" should not be equated
with "foreseeable interaction" between the purchased product and the
damaged property. Foreseeable interaction, by itself, does not show that
damage was reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of the "disap-
pointed expectations" test. We broach this topic because a sentence in
Grams might be read to suggest otherwise. The Grams court stated: "If
a product is expected and intended to interact with other products and
property, it naturally follows that the product could adversely affect and
even damage that property." Read in isolation, the sentence seemingly
suggests that, any time a purchaser knows a product will come into some
sort of contact with other property, the purchaser should anticipate that
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Ultimately, in applying the disappointed expectations test, the court
concluded, "There is no evidence, much less undisputed evidence, show-
ing whether a purchaser in [the plaintiff's] position should reasonably have
anticipated that the defoamer would contain a contaminant such as phe-
nol that would render [its] dairy products unfit for human consumption."'
Thus, the plaintiff's tort claims were reinstated. 19
III. CRITICISMS OF THE THREE APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMIC Loss
DOCTRINE AND A PROPOSAL TO GOVERN CLAIMS INVOLVING
ECONOMIC Loss MORE EFFECTIVELY.
As the economic loss doctrine has evolved, the courts have identified three
important policy considerations supporting this doctrine, and therefore,
these policies aid in evaluating the most effective application of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine.'9 "First, the economic loss doctrine preserves the
fundamental distinction between tort law and contract law." 197 Second,
applying the economic loss doctrine "protects the parties' freedom to al-
locate economic risk by contract."198 Finally, "the doctrine encourages the
purchaser, which is the party best situated to assess the risk of economic
loss, to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk."' 99
A. The Santor Rule
By allowing recovery in tort for mere economic loss, the Santorz°° approach
undermines the fundamental distinction between contract law and tort law.
In Daanen &Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 10 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin recognized the importance of maintaining this distinction by apply-
ing the economic loss doctrine to commercial transactions. Later in Wausau
Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., that court reiterated that "contract law rests
on bargained-for obligations, while tort law is based on legal obligations."
202
the purchased product may damage the other property and bargain ac-
cordingly. But the full discussion in Grams indicates that foreseeable
interaction, by itself, is not enough.
Id. at 295-96 (internal citation omitted).
194 Id. at 300.
195 Id.
196 Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.zd 842, 846 (Wis. 1998); see also
Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445,451 (Wis. 1999).
197 Wausau Tile, 593 N.W.2d at 451.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.zd 305, 3 1o-i 1 (N.J. 1964).
2o Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.zd 842, 852 (Wis. 1998).
202 Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445, 451 (Wis. 1999).
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The court said, "In contract law, the parties' duties arise from the terms of
the particular agreement; the goal is to hold parties to that agreement so
that each receives the benefit of his or her bargain." 03 In contrast, the court
recognized that tort law is aimed at protecting people from unexpected or
overwhelming misfortunes, imposing duties upon manufacturers to protect
society from harm resulting from defective products.2t 4 However, the court
noted that "where a product fails in its intended use and injures only itself,
thereby causing only economic damages to the purchaser, 'the reasons for
imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contrac-
tual remedies are strong."'' 05
The second important policy undermined by the Santor approach is the
need "to protect parties' freedom to allocate economic risks via contract.
Allowing purchasers to elect recovery under tort theories instead of requir-
ing them to rely on their contractual remedies 'rewrites the agreement by
allowing a party to recoup a benefit that was not part of the bargain."' 2°6
For example, in Wausau Tile, a case in which a manufacturer of concrete
paving blocks (Wausau) was disappointed to discover that its product was
ruined because of defective cement used in producing the pavers, 07 the
court noted that Wausau had the opportunity to negotiate and did negoti-
ate a warranty. 08 The court continued that "[piresumably, Wausau Tile
paid a price commensurate with the warranty it received." 2z9 Therefore, the
court reasoned, "[i]fWausau Tile were permitted to reap the benefits of a
broader warranty by recovering its damages in tort, it would receive more
than it bargained for (and paid for) and [the cement seller] would receive
less than it bargained for (and was paid for)."" 0
Finally, the third policy for prohibiting recovery for purely economic
loss in tort is that the doctrine "encourages the party with the best under-
standing of the attendant risks of economic loss, the commercial purchaser,
to assume, allocate, or insure against the risk of loss caused by a defective
product." ''1 The Wausau Tile court stated that "[plurchasers are generally
better equipped than sellers to anticipate the economic loss which a de-
fective product could cause their particular businesses."212 For this reason,
203 Id. at 451-52.
204 Id. at 452.
205 Id. at 452 (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
871 (1986)).
206 Id. at 456.
207 Id. at 449.
2o8 Id. at 456.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. (citing Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis.
1998)).
212 Id.
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courts force purchasers "to guard against foreseeable economic loss by al-
locating the risk by contract or by purchasing insurance," creating a "more
efficient, more predictable marketplace." ' 3 The court said, "[i]f tort re-
covery were permitted, sellers of products would be 'potentially liable for
unbargained-for and unexpected risks,' leading eventually to higher prices
for consumers." ' 4 The court recognized that the purchaser of the cement
should have reasonably expected receiving defective cement, and because
non-defective cement is so critical in making pavers, the purchaser should
have foreseen the end result of defective pavers."' 5
B. The "Type of Consumer" Rule
The problem with the "type of consumer" rule, as noted regarding the San-
tor rule," 6 is that it blurs the line between contract and tort. By allowing
"ordinary consumers" to pursue a remedy in tort, the bargained-for obliga-
tions are no longer binding. If ordinary consumers have failed economic
expectations, which are in fact a province of contract law, they can seek a
remedy in a system created to "impos[e] tort duties upon manufacturers
to protect society's interest in safety from physical harm or personal injury
which may result from defective products." '17 Allowing recovery in tort for
actions involving no actual physical harm destroys the critical distinction
between tort law and contract law.
In addition, the well-established goal of protecting parties' freedom to
allocate economic risk via contract would also be diminished by the "type
of consumer" rule. By changing the rules and permitting ordinary consum-
ers to seek relief in tort, sellers lose "the ability to protect themselves from
foreseeable risks by negotiating sales agreements." ' If the ordinary con-
sumer is not happy with the product, rather than negotiating a warranty, the
ordinary consumer is provided added protection in tort. This would have a
tremendous impact on the market, resulting in higher prices. Ultimately,
ordinary consumers could actually be prohibited from bargaining with sell-
ers who cannot afford the potential liability.
Finally, the "type of consumer" rule would be difficult to apply. The
Seely dissent recognized this problem, saying the "'ordinary consumer' test
needs judicial definition," suggesting it should be interpreted on a case-by-
case basis.1 9 The majority in Seely recognized that the plaintiff's purpose for
213 Id.
214 Id. (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 849 (Wis.
1998)).
215 Id.
216 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
217 Wausau Tile, 593 N.W.2d at 452.
z8 Id. at 456.
219 Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 158 (Cal. 1965) (Peters, J., concurring in part
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purchasing the defective truck was "for use in his business of heavy-duty
hauling,"2 0 which suggests that the plaintiff was a commercial purchaser.
But Justice Peters's dissent believed the plaintiff's status to be an ordinary
consumer, "even though he bought the truck for use in his business."2 ''
Therefore, the uncertainty in applying the "type of consumer" rule would
further undermine the distinction between tort and contract.
C. The "Physical Injury" Rule
Considering the important policies in favor of maintaining a clear distinc-
tion between tort law and contract law, the "physical injury" rule is the
most appropriate and effective standard. As Justice Traynor explained in
Seely, "[tihe distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary
and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an accident caus-
ing physical injury." ' Instead, Justice Traynor believed that the important
distinction rested on an "understanding of the nature of the responsibility
a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products." ' 3 In other
words, manufacturers can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries
caused by defective products that are unreasonably dangerous. This is
a traditional strict tort liability claim. However, Justice Traynor declared
that the manufacturer cannot be held to the same standard of liability for
merely not "meet[ing] the consumer's demands."2 14 Liability for the man-
ufacturer's failure to meet the consumer's economic expectations should
be imposed only if the parties contractually agreed that those economic
demands would be met. Therefore, this issue is best governed in contract
law.
Although the "physical injury" test is the predominant approach for
the economic loss doctrine, its application varies widely by jurisdiction.2 '
Therefore, depending on the state in which the cause of action is pursued,
manufacturers are left with uncertainty as to their potential liability. As
Grams noted, without a reasonable methodology to go along with the eco-
nomic loss rule, all manufacturers could potentially be "transformed 'into
insurers with seemingly unlimited tort liability."'22 16 Savvy plaintiffs could
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226 Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.zd 167, 172 (Wis. 2005) (quoting Daanen &
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
potentially forum shop and select a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction that would
permit recovery for economic loss in tort. As a result, with no ability to
share their risk with the purchaser or limit liability to losses that would tra-
ditionally be included in the terms of the contract, "manufacturers would
understandably be reluctant to produce certain products.""2 7 This would
also prevent manufacturers from providing lower prices to purchasers who
are willing to assume the risk of certain losses."' This chilling effect could
have detrimental repercussions on the marketplace.
Incorporating the "disappointed expectations" test in the "physical in-
jury" approach to the economic loss doctrine is important because it main-
tains a watchful eye on the contractual agreement at hand. By focusing on
the contract itself, this approach takes a critical look at the purpose of the
bargain and the expected uses of the product. If a product fails to perform
as it should, the loss stems from disappointed expectations. However, in
situations similar to Foremost Farms, a manufacturer of a defective product
cannot escape tort liability. Although a reasonable purchaser would have
foreseen that the Foremost Farms defoamer would be used to make the end
dairy product, the appropriate inquiry is "whether a purchaser in [the plain-
tiff's] position should reasonably have anticipated that the defoamer would
contain a contaminant such as phenol that would render [the plaintiffs]
dairy products unfit for human consumption."" 9
The "disappointed expectations" approach strikes the appropriate bal-
ance not only to prevent "contract from drowning in a sea of tort" but also
to prevent "tort from drowning in a sea of contract."2 30 When the proper ve-
hicle for resolving a dispute rests in contract law, this distinction prevents
a plaintiff from benefiting from the spoils of tort liability. However, this
two-step process also prohibits manufacturers from escaping tort liability
for damage to "other property" as a result of their unreasonably defective
products. Therefore, the "disappointed expectations" approach should be
incorporated into the "integrated systems" language in the comments to
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 21 to provide con-
sistency from state to state and to maintain the proper line between con-
tract law and tort law for manufacturers and consumers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judicially created economic loss doctrine bars recovery in tort for sole-
ly economic losses arising from a contract. Application of this doctrine is a
Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.zd 842, 85o(Wis. 1998)).
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constantly developing area of law in need of an approach which fulfills the
fundamental policy considerations at stake. The East River "physical in-
jury" approach has evolved into a confusing, difficult doctrine, and judges,
lawyers, and the public at large continue to struggle to identify whether
or not a particular set of facts apply under this approach. 3' This confu-
sion stems from the daunting task of distinguishing the actual defective
product from "other property." Without much guidance, courts ultimately
have free reign, which results in inconsistent outcomes.3" For this reason,
the "disappointed expectations" test is critical to the "other property" ex-
ception analysis and should be incorporated into the "integrated systems"
approach in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Not only
does the "disappointed expectations" test further the fundamental poli-
cies supporting the economic loss doctrine, it also provides more consistent
outcomes and is a more user-friendly approach for the courts.
231 See Laubmeier, supra note 33, at 226.
232 See Ausness, supra note 5, at 525-27 (recognizing that some courts permit recovery in
tort for product damage in all cases; other courts look at the nature of the defect and manner in
which damage occurs, permitting recovery in tort when the consumer is subject to an immedi-
ate risk of physical injury; and a majority of courts treat all damage to the defective product as
economic loss, barring recovery).
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